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Abstract. Many security issues have come to the fore with the increasingly
widespread adoption of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. The Mirai attack on
Dyn DNS service, in which vulnerable IoT devices such as IP cameras, DVRs
and routers were infected and used to propagate large-scale DDoS attacks, is
one of the more prominent recent examples. IoT botnets, consisting of hundreds-
of-thousands of bots, are currently present “in-the-wild” at least and are only
expected to grow in the future, with the potential to cause significant network
downtimes and financial losses to network companies. We propose, therefore,
to build testbeds for evaluating IoT botnets and design suitable mitigation tech-
niques against them. A DETERlab-based IoT botnet testbed is presented in this
work. The testbed is built in a secure contained environment and includes ancil-
lary services such as DHCP, DNS as well as botnet infrastructure including CnC
and scanListen/loading servers. Developing an IoT botnet testbed presented us
with some unique challenges which are different from those encountered in non-
IoT botnet testbeds and we highlight them in this paper. Further, we point out the
important features of our testbed and illustrate some of its capabilities through
experimental results.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of things (IoT) [1] refers to the network of low-power, limited process-
ing capability sensing devices which can send/receive data to/from other devices using
wireless technologies such as RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), Zigbee, WiFi,
Bluetooth, cellular etc. IoT devices are being deployed in a number of applications
such as wearables, home automation, smart grids, environmental monitoring, infrastruc-
ture management, industrial automation, agricultural automation, healthcare and smart
cities. Some of the popular platforms for IoT are Samsung SmartThings (consumer IoT
for device management) and Amazon Web Services IoT, Microsoft Azure IoT, Google
Cloud Platform (enterprise IoT for cloud storage and data analytics). The number of IoT
devices deployed globally by 2020 is expected to be in the range of 20-30 billion [2].
The number of devices has been increasing steadily (albeit at a slower rate than some
earlier generous predictions), and this trend is expected to hold in the future.
IoT devices are being increasingly targeted by hackers using malware (malicious
software) as they are easier to infect than conventional computers for the following
reasons [3–5]:
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– There are many legacy IoT devices connected to the Internet with no security up-
dates.
– Security is given a low priority within the development cycle of IoT devices.
– Implementing conventional cryptography in IoT devices is computationally expen-
sive due to processing power and memory constraints.
– Many IoT devices have weak login credentials either provided by the manufacturer
or configured by users.
– IoT device manufacturers sometimes leave backdoors (such as an open port) to
provide support for the device remotely.
– Often, consumer IoT devices are connected to the Internet without going through a
firewall.
In a widely publicized attack, the IoT malware Mirai was used to propagate the biggest
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack on record on October 21, 2016. The at-
tack targeted the Dyn DNS (Domain Name Service) servers [6] and generated an attack
throughput of the order of 1.2 Tbps. It disabled major internet services such as Amazon,
Twitter and Netflix. The attackers had infected IoT devices such as IP cameras and DVR
recorders with Mirai, thereby creating an army of bots (botnet) to take part in the DDoS
attack. Apart from Mirai, there are other IoT malware which operate using a similar
brute force technique of scanning random IP addresses for open ports and attempting
to login using a built-in dictionary of commonly used credentials. BASHLITE [7], Re-
maiten [8], and Hajime [9] are some examples of these IoT malware.
Bots compromised by Mirai or similar IoT malware can be used for DDoS attacks,
phishing and spamming [10]. These attacks can cause network downtime for long peri-
ods which may lead to financial loss to network companies, and leak users’ confidential
data. McAfee reported in April 2017 [11] that about 2.5 million IoT devices were in-
fected by Mirai in late 2016. Bitdefender mentioned in its blog in September 2017 [12]
that researchers had estimated at least 100,000 devices infected by Mirai or similar
malware revealed daily through telnet scanning telemetry data. Further, many of the
infected devices are expected to remain infected for a long time. Therefore, there is a
substantial motivation for studying these IoT botnets so as to characterize, detect and
develop effective countermeasures against them.
A comprehensive IoT botnet testbed environment will be quite useful for researchers
working towards this goal. Further, the testbed can be used to generate useful ground
truth data for researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of their proposed IoT botnet
detection algorithms. As pointed out in [13], botnet emulation studies in controlled
laboratory environments have a number of advantages (e.g. closeness to real-world bot-
nets, greater degree of safety and control over experiment environment, fewer legal
and ethical issues) when it comes to botnet research compared to analytical modelling,
simulation studies, botnet binary reverse engineering and in-the-wild botnet analysis.
In this work, we present a testbed environment built using the National Cybersecu-
rity R&D Lab (NCL) [14] infrastructure and consisting of physical and virtual machines
(VMs) which can be used to study Mirai-like IoT botnets. As pointed out later, the same
testbed can be modified to work with other IoT botnets as well. The testbed includes
ancillary services such as Domain Name Service (DNS), Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP), botnet infrastructure which includes Command-and-Control (CnC)
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and scanListen/loading servers, and a secure contained environment for testing. The
last two services are provided by DETERLab [15], which provides the software stack
on which the NCL testbed is based. A secure contained environment is especially crit-
ical since many of the botnets are capable of further infecting devices connected to the
Internet. This testbed is mainly targeted at cyber security researchers who can easily and
quickly bootstrap IoT botnet experiments on our testbed. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first testbed to emulate the full behavior of an IoT botnet. In the subsequent
sections, we review published research on botnet testbeds. We also elaborate on our ex-
perience setting up the various components of the testbed and the related challenges that
we faced. Finally, we include some experimental results from our testbed that illustrate
its capabilities.
2 Related Work
There have been several research works on the study of botnets through testbeds. Bar-
ford et al [16] have presented a toolkit for Emulab-enabled testbeds (such as DETERlab)
called Botnet Evaluation Environment (BEE), designed to provide bots and botnets for
experimentation in a scalabale and secure/self-contained environment. BEE includes a
library of OS/bot images to be run on physical and virtual machines as well as a set of
services and tools required for botnet evaluation such as DHCP, DNS, IRC, VM moni-
tors and honeypots. [17] has proposed a composable botnet framework called SLING-
bot which can be used to construct botnets with different (Command and Control) C2
structures (including potential future botnet C2 structures), simulate botnet traffic, char-
acterize it and develop botnet defense techniques.
In [13], the authors have argued for isolated in-the-lab at-scale botnet experimen-
tation and evaluated an emulated 3000-node Waledac botnet. Further, they have also
validated a defense technique (using sybil attack) against the botnet. [18] has argued
for large-scale botnet emulation that is at par with actual botnets (hundreds of thou-
sands to millions of bots) and potentially discover issues that show up at that scale. The
authors have presented a prototype testbed with 600,000 Linux VMs or 62,000 Win-
dows 7 VMs on a 520 node computing cluster through over-budgeting of processor and
memory resources and other techniques. Since few works have paid attention to con-
tainment in botnet emulation, a malware execution farm, GQ has been presented in [19]
which focuses on methodical development of explicit containment policies for malware
measurement and analysis.
ElSheikh et al. [20] have addressed the lack of publicly available botnet research
datasets by creating an in-lab botnet experimentation testbed in a contained environ-
ment and using it to generate botnet datasets. [21] has implemented an HTTP (Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol)-based botnet testbed for performing HTTP GET flooding at-
tacks against web servers. The authors have also provided real-time data sets (including
http bot traces) for researchers to evaluate such botnets and proposed countermeasures
against DDoS attacks from those botnets. Finally, in [22], the authors have presented
a controlled network environment based on VMware virtualization technology, called
V-Network, for analyzing network worm propagation patterns and evaluating counter-
measure systems.
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This paper makes an important contribution since there has been no work till now
on creating IoT botnet testbeds emulating the full behavior of IoT malware. Our testbed
is similar to [16] in the sense that it is also based on DETERlab and provides services
such as DNS, DHCP, CnC etc. but the challenges encountered by us (as pointed out in
section 3.3) were different because the testbed in [16] was focused on PC-based bots
and not IoT bots. In comparison to [13] and [18], our current focus is not on scalability
since we can increase the number of bots in our testbed easily by installing more VMs
per physical machine and adding more physical machines. However, we intend to look
into their techniques in the future to increase the number of bots in our testbed to more
accurately represent real-world IoT botnets. We are in the process of collecting datasets
for the IoT botnet research community, similar to [20], and hope to release them in
near future. Out testbed is not restricted to specific attacks such as HTTP flooding [21]
and we also use virtualization to create multiple bots on a physical machine, albeit not
through VMWare hypervisor as done in [22].
3 IoT Botnet Testbed
In this section, we begin by giving an overview of the operation of Mirai, followed by
a detailed discussion on the process of setting up various components of our IoT botnet
testbed. We move on to highlight the challenges during testbed setup and how they were
overcome. Finally, the major features of our testbed are pointed out.
3.1 Overview of Mirai
The Mirai [23] setup consists of three major components: bot, scanListen/loading server,
and theCnC (Command-and-Control) server. TheCnC server also functions as a MySQL
[24] database server. User accounts can be created in this database for customers who
wish to hire DDoS-as-a-service. The database on CnC server consists of three tables:
history, user and whitelist. They are assigned bots and can use them to launch a DDoS
attack against their target services. There are a number of attack options available in
Mirai: UDP flood, SYN flood, ACK flood, TCP stomp flood, UDP plain flood, Valve
source engine specific flood, DNS resolver flood, GRE IP flood, GRE Ethernet flood
and HTTP flood.
The operation of Mirai is illustrated in Fig. 1. Once an IoT device is infected with
Mirai (and becomes a bot), it first attempts to connect to the listening CnC server by
resolving its domain name and opening a socket connection. Thereafter, it starts scan-
ning the network by sending SYN packets to random IP addresses and waiting for them
to respond. This process may take a long time since the bot has to go through a large
number of IP addresses. Once it finds a vulnerable device with a TELNET port open, it
attempts to open a socket connection to that device and emulates the TELNET protocol.
Then it attempts to login using a list of default credentials and if successful, it reports
the IP address of the discovered device and the working TELNET login credentials
to the listening scanListen server. The scanListen server sends that information to the
loader which again logs in to the discovered device using the details received from the
scanListen server. Once logged in, the loader downloads the Mirai bot binary to that
device and the new bot connects to the CnC server and starts scanning the network.
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Fig. 1: Operation of various components of Mirai (Source: Radware [25])
3.2 Installing Testbed Components
The testbed shown in Fig. 2 was configured on a computing cluster isolated from the
Internet. Each cluster node has two Intel Xeon E5-2620 processors, 64 GB DDR4 ECC
memory and runs Ubuntu 14.04 LTS standard image. The first step was to configure
a local authoritative DNS server on one of the testbed nodes because infected Mirai
bots connect to CnC and scanListen servers using domain names instead of fixed IP
addresses. The reason behind this design can be that the malware authors did not want
the CnC/scanListen servers to be taken down if their IP addresses were identified by
security personnel. If domain names are used for connection instead, the IP addresses
mapped to those domain names can be easily changed if they have been identified and
blocked. Originally, the Mirai source code (bot/resolv.c) uses the Google DNS servers
located at IP address 8.8.8.8 for domain name-to-IP address conversion. However, since
we were working on a secure isolated testbed with no outside Internet connectivity , we
could not use Google DNS servers. Therefore, it became essential for us to configure a
local DNS server on our testbed. We used BIND9 (Berkeley Internet Naming Daemon)
to configure a local name server as a primary master, creating forward and reverse zone
files. The next step entailed configuring a CnC server (by creating a MYSQL database)
on a testbed node and the scanListen/loader on another node.
The IoT devices used in our testbed are Raspberry Pi (RPi) devices emulated us-
ing QEMU [26], an open source machine emulator and hardware virtualizer. Each RPi
device runs Raspbian (Wheezy version) and is configured with ARM 1176 (v6) CPU
and 256MB of RAM. The CnC and scanListen server domain names and port numbers
were updated in bot/table.c file in the RPi. Since the emulated RPi devices need to con-
nect to the CnC and scanListen servers using their domain names, the details of local
DNS server were added to the /etc/resolv.conf files in emulated devices which query
the local DNS server to get the IP addresses corresponding to the domain names and
then connect to those IP addresses. The codes for bot, CnC server, scanListen server
and loader were compiled using the script, mirai/build.sh. Since we wanted to compile
the bot binaries for RPi (which runs on ARM platform) on a testbed node running on
6 A. Kumar et al.
Fig. 2: Testbed used to simulate Mirai behavior
x86 platform, we also had to setup cross-compilers using the scripts/cross-compile.sh
script.
3.3 Challenges Encountered in Testbed Setup
One of the major challenges was the TELNET protocol emulation in Mirai source code.
When the original bot binary compiled from source code was run on an emulated RPi
device, it was unable to receive the TELNET username prompt. Without the username
prompt, it was impossible to try the usernames from the list of default credentials and
find a working one. Hence, the first bot could never successfully infect another emulated
device, thus preventing us from simulating the real propagation behavior of Mirai on our
testbed. It became imperative for us to modify the code handling the TELNET protocol
emulation in the original Mirai source code so that it worked on our testbed.
When a TELNET client makes a connection request to a server, there is a negotia-
tion phase where an exchange of a specific sequence of bytes takes place between the
client and the server before the client is served with the username prompt. The origi-
nal TELNET byte exchange logic in Mirai source code (function: consume_iacs(), file:
bot/scanner.c) is shown in Fig. 5. Since this logic was not working on our testbed, we
created a hack and sent a TELNET connection request from one of our testbed nodes
to another. The underlying byte exchange was analyzed using tcpdump which is a very
useful packet analyzer that is usually installed by default on Linux machines. We modi-
fied the code in consume_iacs() function to replicate the above byte exchange sequence
which is depicted in Fig. 3. Again, after the username prompt is served to the client
and the username is entered, there is a byte exchange between the TELNET client and
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server before the password prompt is served. Therefore, we modified the code in con-
sume_pass_prompt() with the required byte sequence so that the testbed bot is served
the password prompt, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3: Changes made in consume_iacs() function in Mirai source code
For the emulated RPi (on which Mirai binary is executed) to scan nearby devices,
it needs to connect to the host network. By default, QEMU assigns a static IP address
(10.0.2.15) to the emulated RPi if the user has not specified any network interfaces in
the script that brings up the RPi, thereby leaving no connectivity between RPi and host.
One of the ways to achieve this connectivity is by using bridge-TAP configuration. A
network bridge refers to a device that connects two separate network segments using the
same communication protocol, allowing them to operate as a single aggregate network.
TAP interface is a virtual network interface that sends and receives layer 2 packets such
as Ethernet frames not through a physical “wire”, but instead by writing and reading
data respectively from user-space programs. We used brctl to configure Ethernet bridge
on the host, tunctl to create and manage TAP interfaces and libvrt virtualization man-
agement library to automatically setup a DHCP server and bridge (virbr0) on the host.
The virbr0 comes up with a default IP address(192.168.122.1), so the IP address had to
be changed for each host using virsh utility. The TAP interface was bound to the bridge
and the QEMU RPi was brought up with a network interface attached to the TAP de-
vice. Any packets sent from the RPi are now written to the TAP interface and forwarded
by the attached bridge to the host network. Similarly, packets sent from the host net-
work are forwarded through the bridge to the attached TAP interface from where they
are read by RPi operating system. Since we were emulating multiple QEMU VMs on
a physical node, a base Raspbian image was created in qcow2 format and using it as
a backing file, we generated disk images which store only the differences from base
image to avoid using multiple raw image files and save on storage space.
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Fig. 4: Changes made in consume_pass_prompt() function in Mirai source code
3.4 Testbed Features
The main features of our IoT botnet testbed are listed below:
– Using Network Simulator (NS) scripts, users can conveniently start, stop, modify
and restart malware experiments instead of employing manual configuration.
– The emulated Raspberry Pi devices are quite close to the real-world IoT devices in
terms of the platform, operating system, applications and networking capabilities.
– Our testbed can be scaled to add more IoT devices (by increasing the number of
QEMU VMs per physical machine), gateways, routers and other network devices
as per user simulation requirements. It also supports the integration of both physical
and virtual devices.
– The testbed topology, i.e. the way the routers, gateways and IoT devices are con-
nected to each other, can be changed to simulate different types of networks.
– More advanced versions or derivatives of Mirai malware can be tested on our
testbed since the ancillary infrastructure required (consisting of DNS server, CnC
server, scanListen/loader) is already configured. The only remaining requirement
is to run the specific malware binary on the emulated IoT devices.
– IoT malware exploiting software vulnerabilities (such as Reaper, Satori etc.) can
also be tested on our testbed by running the corresponding bot binaries/compiled
source codes/exploit codes on the emulated RPi devices and making a few other
modifications in the ancillary services and botnet infrastructure.
4 Experimental Results
As shown in Fig. 2, the local DNS server, CnC (Command-and-Control) server, scan-
Listen/loading server and the victim server (which is to be attacked through DDoS) are
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Fig. 5: TELNET client-server negotiation logic used in Mirai source code
all connected to a single LAN. In practice, all the above servers are parts of different
sub-networks connected to the Internet. The NCL testbed has a limitation of maximum
two network interfaces per physical node, thereby restricting us from simulating more
realistic networks with multiple connections. However, this restriction does not impair
our testbed functions such as scanning of vulnerable devices, bot-CnC communications,
infection of emulated devices and attacks launched from infected devices. These func-
tions are are not dependent on the relative placement of DNS server, CnC server, scan-
Listen/loading server and victim server in the network. Further connected to the same
LAN are three routers, two of which are connected to IoT gateways (physical devices
acting as a bridge between IoT devices and the cloud) and the third one is connected
to non-IoT devices (e.g. PC). Finally, each gateway is connected to 10 IoT devices. We
chose this gateway-IoT device topology since it is used in a number of IoT deployments
(such as IP cameras, smart lighting devices, wearables etc.). The IoT devices can run
a video streaming server to simulate the operation of an IP camera (IoT device used in
Mirai attack on Dyn). A few IoT devices were configured to have their TELNET port
number 23 open and listening for connections.
We have plotted the volume of bot-CnC traffic with time for a single bot (traffic
volume in packets per second) in Fig. 6. As expected, there are busy and non-busy
periods in the bot-CnC traffic. The busy period is when there is exchange of keep-alive
messages (PSH+ACK) between the bot and the CnC server. Here, PSH refers to a push
message and ACK refers to acknowledgement. Since the keep-alive messages are sent
at regular intervals, one can observe periodic spikes in the bot-CnC traffic rate. The
transmission of bot scanning packets is illustrated in Fig.7. As can be observed, the
scanning packets are sometimes transmitted within short intervals and at other times
they are transmitted far apart, resembling a Poisson process.
In the next experiment, we commanded few infected bots to attack the victim server
with UDP flood traffic which reaches a rate of 48K pps (packets per second). The attack
does not wait for ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) reply packets (such as
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Fig. 6: Volume of bot-CnC traffic with time
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Packet arrival times (sequence number) ×104
Fig. 7: Transmission times of bot scanning packets
destination unreachable) to be sent back by the victim server. One of the non-IoT nodes
in the testbed was configured as a UDP client. Once the victim server was overwhelmed,
it started dropping legitimate UDP requests from the client. This can be noted from Fig.
8 which depicts the client UDP connection packet capture after the attack.
We also conducted a TCP SYN flooding attack in which ≈ 46K pps were transmit-
ted by the bots without listening for SYN-ACK packets sent back by the victim server.
During the attack, the victim server encountered congestion as can be inferred from Fig.
9. It started sending out duplicate ACKs and retransmits packets multiple times which
stop once the attack is over. This resulted in a denial of service to the benign TCP traffic
from the client.
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Fig. 8: Client UDP connection packet capture after UDP flood attack
Fig. 9: Client TCP connection packet capture after SYN flood attack
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a DETERlab-based IoT botnet testbed built within a secure
contained environment with ancillary services such as DHCP, DNS and botnet infras-
tructure comprising of CnC and scanListen/loading servers. We described the setup pro-
cess for various components of the testbed and associated challenges. The main features
of the testbed were also listed. Finally, we ran some basic experiments and discussed
the results showing bot-CnC communication, scanning traffic and few DDoS attacks
which demonstrated the capabilities of our testbed.
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